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Late Starter: A Situation or a Process? 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper critically evaluates the assumptions of the network model of 
internationalisation in terms of a firm’s market knowledge. The discussion is 
illustrated with the entry of a Portuguese firm into the United States, which can be 
regarded as a situation of Late Starter. The case suggests that foreign market entry 
cannot be dissociated from the firm’s ability to acquire knowledge through 
relationships with other firms. The notion of situations in the network model of 
internationalisation should thus be reformulated in order to consider the sub-processes 
they are associated with. One such a process is the firm’s acquisition of objective 
knowledge and experiential knowledge. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Two key indicators of economic globalisation are growing international trade and 
foreign direct investment. According to the World Trade Organization, international 
trade has reached 7.7 trillion dollars in 2000 being 22-times higher than in 1950. 
Foreign direct investment, on the other hand, has, according to United Nations, 
reached record levels of 1.3 trillion dollars in the same year. The intensification of 
international trade and foreign direct investment may, in turn, be associated with both 
multinational corporations and small and medium enterprises. The United Nations, for 
instance, estimate that there are around 64,000 multinational corporations with 
870,000 foreign affiliates, being responsible for one third of world exports.  
 
At the micro level, international trade and foreign direct investment have been 
addressed in both studies of multinational corporations and of internationalisation. In 
this respect, knowledge has been increasingly associated with successful operations 
abroad either as a source of competitive advantage of multinationals (e.g. Doz et al. 
2001) or as an explanatory variable of patterns of internationalisation (e.g. Johanson 
and Vahlne 1977). In the latter case, the most debated internationalisation process 
model is probably the Uppsala model (cf. Andersen 1993) in which knowledge is 
divided into objective knowledge and experiential knowledge (cf. Penrose 1959). 
“Objective knowledge is acquired through standardized methods of collecting and 
transmitting information, i.e., market research, and can easily be transferred to other 
countries and replicated by other firms” whereas “experiential knowledge is country-
specific and cannot be transferred between firms or business units” (Eriksson et al. 
1997:340). In general, internationalisation process models suggest that experiential 
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knowledge is more important than objective knowledge in explaining firm 
internationalisation (e.g. Johanson and Vahlne 1977, 1990; Luostarinen 1980).            
 
Within the IMP tradition, market knowledge has also been present in the discussion of 
internationalisation (e.g. Johanson and Mattsson 1988) but not as a crucial 
explanatory construct. Instead, other aspects of internationalisation have been 
highlighted such as the actors to whom the firm is related during that process and their 
respective position in a wider production network (e.g. Axelsson and Johanson 1992).  
 
The purpose of the present paper is, therefore, to examine the extent to which a firm’s 
knowledge is determinant for its internationalisation in the context of an industrial 
network. The key questions addressed are: 
  
a) What type of knowledge is implicit in the network model of 
internationalisation?  
b) Can such knowledge be located within the internationalising firm? 
 
In the next section the key assumptions of the network model of internationalisation 
are thus reviewed. The methodological aspects of the project in which the present 
paper is based are discussed in the third section, whereas the correspondent case 
description is presented in the fourth section. The insights from the case are discussed 
in the following section, which precedes some concluding remarks in the sixth 
section.  
 
2. THE NETWORK MODEL OF INTERNATIONALISATION 
 
The network model of internationalisation has been initially proposed by Johansson 
and Mattsson (1988) and later illustrated with three cases by Axelsson and Johansson 
(1992). From such a perspective, internationalisation “means that the firm establishes 
and develops network positions in foreign markets” (Axelsson and Johanson 
1992:218) and can be achieved in at least three ways. Firstly, the firm may establish 
positions in country-based networks, which are new to the firm i.e. international 
extension. Secondly, the firm may develop its already existing positions in foreign 
country-based networks i.e. penetration. Finally, the firm may increase the 
coordination between its positions in different country-based networks i.e. 
international integration.  
 
Such three ways represent the “how” of firm internationalisation in industrial markets 
and may, in turn, occur in four different types of situations, which explain “why” 
firms internationalise. In particular such situations are based on the assumption that 
“the internationalisation characteristics of both the firm and of the market influence 
the process” (Johanson and Mattsson 1997:201). Such characteristics include the 
firm’s market assets as well as the market assets of other firms in the network both in 
the home country of the internationalising firm and in the target country or countries. 
It is perhaps such a holistic characterisation of internationalisation situations that lead 
the following criticism to the model (Axelsson and Johanson 1992:219): 
 
The internationalisation dimension is somewhat loosely premised in the discussion. It 
could either be interpreted as entry to a specific new market or as a characterisation of 
the whole production net.     
 3
 
The present paper shares that criticism being, therefore, exclusively focused on the 
process of foreign market entry rather than on whether the production net is national 
or international. According to Axelsson and Johanson (1992:219) foreign market 
entry can be defined as “the whole process by which firms enter foreign markets over 
long periods”. An alternative focus on internationalisation would be on the 
characteristics of the firm and the target country or countries at a certain point in time. 
In this respect and as mentioned above, four situations have been suggested in the 
network model of internationalisation, which are based on the combination of the 
degree of firm- and market (production net) internationalisation. Johanson and 
Mattsson (1988) label such situations the Early Starter (low/low), the Later Starter 
(low/high), the Lonely International (high/low), and the International Among Others 
(high/high).   
 
Although an extensive description of the four situations is out of the scope of the 
present paper (see Johanson and Mattsson 1988, 1997), it is worth reviewing the role 
of knowledge in each situation. In a situation of Early Starter, it is assumed that “the 
firm has little knowledge about foreign markets and it cannot count upon utilising 
relationships in the domestic market to gain such knowledge” (Johanson and Mattsson 
1997:202), whereas in a situation of Lonely International, the firm “already possesses 
good knowledge about many kinds of national markets” (Johanson and Mattsson 
1997:204). On the other hand, it is assumed that “the Late Starter has a comparative 
disadvantage in terms of its lesser market knowledge as compared with its 
competitors” (Johanson and Mattsson 1997:205), whereas in a situation of 
International Among Others, “the international knowledge level is higher” (Johanson 
and Mattsson 1997:206).     
 
From such a description it may be argued that, in contrast to process models of 
internationalisation (e.g. Johanson and Vahlne 1977, 1990; Luostarinen 1980), 
knowledge has not been consistently treated as an explanatory variable in the network 
model of internationalisation (Johanson and Mattsson 1988, 1997). The present paper 
thus attempts to explore such a gap by focusing on a single situation: the Late Starter. 
The selection of such a situation is, in turn, primarily justified with the research 
project on which the present paper is based. The research strategy and design adopted 
in such a project are discussed in the following section. 
 
3. METHOD 
 
The present paper is based on a research project, which adopted case study 
methodology. Case studies are an appropriate method for the analysis of “how” and 
“why” questions and of events over which the researcher has little control (Yin 1994). 
The selected case - Vitrocristal – illustrates a network of private and public entities, 
aiming at the creation and internationalisation of a new brand. Such network may thus 
be regarded as an issue-based net (Brito 1999) i.e. a network of actors dealing with a 
particular topic through mutual or conflicting interests.  
 
The network under analysis consisted of actors aiming at the design and 
implementation, national and internationally, of a brand associated to the Marinha 
Grande Glass Region in Portugal. From an issue-based net perspective (Brito 1999), 
the unit of analysis in such a network is not the focal organization nor the whole 
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network, but network action per se. Such action, which can be spontaneous or 
deliberated, allows the researcher to capture the dynamic characteristics of industrial 
systems moved by collective interests. 
 
Data collection was primarily based on semi-structured interviews. The questions 
were designed to examine the phenomenon in its real context, once the borders 
between the phenomena and its context are blurred (Yin 1994). The main questions 
were based on the A-R-A model (Håkansson and Johanson 1984) and its applicability 
to firm internationalisation (Johanson and Mattsson 1988). In particular, an effort was 
made to obtain information on how the actors’ interests were fulfilled, the resources 
shared, and activities coordinated.  
 
Data was collected both explicitly and implicitly. In the latter case, cross questions 
were adopted, enabling the interviewee to analyse the topic in an indirect way. In 
order to accommodate the specific educational level of some interviewees certain 
questions were posed in relatively prosaic style (Langley 1999).  
 
The network consisted of twenty-four (24) firms, including producers and 
transformers, which in some cases were members of the industrial association. In 
terms of size, the network included firms with very small (less than 10 employees) 
and small (less than 25 employees) size. It must be noted as well that not all firms 
joined the network at the time of its inception.   
 
Six (6) out of twenty-four (24) firms were selected as a representative sample of the 
network. In order to increase the reliability of the findings, the study included data 
triangulation (Yin 1994), namely two press articles that confirmed some of the 
interviewees’ answers. In this respect, Eisenhardt (1989) also refers to data overlap as 
a means of enhancing case analysis. Interviews were thus supplemented with 
publications in the local and national press as well as with direct observation.  
 
Criteria such as prudence and embeddedness in the context were used in order to 
guarantee data relevance. Other interviews were conducted with major actors in the 
Vitrocristal network, namely the focal firm – Vitrocristal, the industrial association 
(Associação Industrial de Cristalaria), the Regional Crystal Comission, the national 
institute of small and medium-sized enterprises (Instituto de Apoio às Pequenas e 
Médias Empresas), the strategic consultant – Augusto Mateus & Associados, and the 
industry analysts – Roland Berger & Partners. 
 
In the initial phase of data analysis, the data was presented in a systematic and 
organized way, frequently using historic narratives. Taking into consideration 
concrete events and their context, some generalizations were then formulated and 
associated with extant literature (Langley 1999). 
 
4. THE CASE OF VITROCRISTAL 
 
The crystal sector, which includes products of crystal and glass products obtained 
through semi-automatic and automatic processes, has been one of the most vulnerable 
in Portugal. The sector has been suffering from several constrains including: 
competition from low wage countries (e.g. Eastern Europe); low productivity rates; 
lack of skilled labour; powerful labour unions; small customer base; narrow gross 
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margins; lack of control over distribution channels; lack of branding; lack of 
international recognition; lack of design and market research; and lack of sustainable 
communication and marketing strategies. The majority of firms operating in the sector 
are located in Marinha Grande region, which produces 80% of crystal in Portugal and 
employs 30% of the region’s active population. 
 
Vitrocristal is a complementary group of firms, which was formed in 1993 with the 
support of the industrial association. Its creation occurred as an attempt to modernise 
the local industry given its firms’ reduced degree of competitiveness. The government 
decided to intervene in the recovery of the sector having assigned such task to the 
national institute of small and medium-sized enterprises. Because such governmental 
body was not entitled to receive public money Vitrocristal was created and public 
funds were distributed among the firms enrolled in a production ability program.  
 
Two years later, the lack of visible improvements forced the experts to consider 
alternative measures beyond mere production processes. In particular, some 
suggestions were made in terms of brand, design, offering and new markets. In this 
respect, a leading role was assigned to the industrial association. In fact, the head of 
the industrial association became the very mentor of Vitrocristal and required 
assistance from industry analysts in order to develop a cooperation model.  
 
Such a model was meant to support faster decision-making, closer interaction with the 
market, identification of opportunities, product differentiation, and increased 
operational flexibility. The idea was to build a progressive horizontal cooperation 
model, in which a step would follow previous ones and gradually increase the level of 
ambition. Ultimately, the level of ambition would include the firm’s 
internationalisation taking advantage of the combination of small and large firm sizes. 
 
The value chain of the sector was analysed as well as the activities that had to be 
performed with outside support. As a result, three elements were identified as crucial 
to the modernisation process: the Marinha Grande Glass Region, Vitrocristal, and a 
new technical and commercial operator to be in charge of marketing and 
internationalisation. The Marinha Grande Glass Region was created to: articulate 
central, local, industrial and regional policies; implement a total quality strategy; 
promote a differentiated image of the sector and the region; and improve relations 
with suppliers.  
 
Vitrocristal, on the other hand, was created to coordinate the firms with the industrial 
association, supporting infrastructures, and society at large. One of its goals was the 
creation and development of management capability through the recognition of the 
special needs of the sector and its accommodation by the cooperation model being 
implemented. The technical and commercial operator was the industry analyst –
Roland Berger & Partners – remaining external to Vitrocristal, but available to its 
firms. Its selection resulted from its consulting experience with market research and 
strategic formulation for the industry in Europe. Its worldwide expertise in the sector, 
including close contact with some specific markets, was also valued in its selection. 
 
The implementation of the cooperation model required some further measures such as 
the creation of a demarked region and the establishment of an educational centre. A 
Regional Crystal Comission was also created being assigned the involvement of all 
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forces in the region. The commission was expected to improve the promotion of the 
region and its products, and to promote any projects that may benefit specific 
technical processes. It was also responsible for the establishment of standards to 
which the firms producing and transforming crystal products should conform. 
 
Firms in the region were informed of the conditions to be a part of the network and 
other bodies were invited to equally be part of it. This was the case of the professional 
educational and training centre – Crisform, which was in charge of educating the 
industry’s labour force; and the French fashion analyst – Nelly Rodi – who was in 
charge of identifying fashion and market tendencies. In sum, the production network 
aggregates the entities shown in Figure 1, in which the dotted lines (left side) 
represent relationships primarily based on information exchange (IMP group 1982). 
 
Figure 1 – Glass production network in Marinha Grande 
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A key aim of the Marinha Grande Glass Region project was the creation of a brand, 
which would promote the firms of the region nationally and internationally. The idea 
was to create an industrial brand based on a “controlled origin denomination”, in 
order to enhance the quality of the crystal produced in Marinha Grande. The brand 
was named “MGlass” having become a distinctive factor of the region. The products 
of the different firms in the network were now granted a seal of the region upon the 
compliance to certain standards of quality and design.  
 
Given the attractiveness of some markets, Vitrocristal decided to enter European 
markets as well as the US market. Market studies had identified substantial rates of 
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growth in countries such as Spain, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, Sweden, 
Belgium, The Netherlands, and Japan. In some European countries Vitrocristal 
adopted export entry modes, following similar experiences by some of its constituent 
firms.  
 
In addition, outside consultants emphasised the strategic importance of the US market 
in terms of opportunities and reference value. In the United States Vitrocristal adopted 
an investment entry mode supported by its MGlass brand. The objective was the 
achievement of a 1% market share within five years. For that purpose, the firm 
participated in a showroom in New York and an advisory firm was hired to identify 
market tendencies. In addition, market knowledge from Roland Berger and ICEP 
(Investments, Trade and Tourism of Portugal) was utilized. A permanent showroom 
was then opened in one of the most famous avenues in Manhattan. The firm operated 
as a sales subsidiary, option that allows a better control over the distribution channels 
and a better return from the investments made in the creation of the brand. 
 
In terms of promotion, Vitrocristal decided to use local advertisement firms with 
special emphasis on branding. Public relations were also carefully planned given the 
sophistication of the US market in terms of designed glass and crystal products. The 
choice of the US market was based on its attractiveness (namely in terms of size), but 
also on the positions that other actors in the Vitrocristal’s domestic production 
network had in that market. In particular, Roland Berger and ICEP, whose knowledge 
was also brought to Vitrocristal. 
 
At the time of entry to the American market, the majority of the actors in 
Vitrocristal’s production network had already internationalised. They used to search 
for suppliers and place orders wherever it seemed most convenient, based on quality, 
design, costs, flexibility and delivery conditions. Competitors operate worldwide with 
global brands, namely against MGlass in the US market. In addition, the consultants 
hired in order to enter the US market were themselves international, given their 
knowledge of and experience with international markets. 
 
In Vitrocristal, most of the firms had already internationalised mainly in reactive 
fashion, that is, following their customers’ initiative to place an order. Foreign 
customers typically contacted the firms in Marinha Grande region and set their orders 
based on certain criteria such as the ability to produce small series according to their 
specifications, the knowledge of some techniques, and quality.  
 
Vitrocristal faced a great delay compared with other actors in the US market, having 
no incumbent’s advantage. However, the network tried to establish a position in a 
small portion of New York’s crystal market. The target market was essentially young 
people with high-income levels and art lovers who appreciate highly designed crystal 
pieces. MGlass products were sold in specific retail chains and department stores, 
with premium prices, which, in spite of the high positioning of the product, remained 
lower than those of Italian and French competitors. 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
 
The Vitrocristal case corresponds to a situation of Late Starter. Indeed, the firm’s 
internationalisation is characterised by a high degree of internationalisation of the 
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target market (US) and a low degree of internationalisation of the firm (Vitrocristal). 
In spite of a large share of sales in foreign markets, the firms belonging to Vitrocristal 
should not be considered highly international given the occasional rather than 
strategic nature of their exports.  
 
On the other hand, entering in the New York market appears to have been primarily 
based on strong relationship investment, including intangible aspects. In particular, 
Vitrocristal’s entry into the US market through a sales subsidiary can be regarded as 
the outcome of a learning process based on the experiences of several actors. In the 
one hand, the firms in the network already had some international experience through 
direct and indirect exports. In the other hand, consultants had reasonable international 
experience. Entering into the US market was thus a cumulative process (Axelsson and 
Johanson 1992) in which the experience of several firms in the local network was 
combined.  
 
Gathering individual knowledge under a leading entity such Vitrocristal has allowed a 
sort of knowledge synthesis, which constituted, in turn, the basis for international 
expansion strategies. In the case of Vitrocristal, knowledge was brought from the 
outside and incorporated into the organisation. The leading entity was Vitrocristal 
itself, personalised by its mentor – the head of the industrial association – and 
respective staff.  
 
Thus far, the interpretation of Vitrocristal’s internationalisation has, nevertheless, 
provided little answer to the questions raised in the introductory section. The first 
question was: what type of knowledge is implicit in the network model of 
internationalisation? In this respect, it is worth reviewing a recent contribution by 
Eriksson et al. (1997) in which they further divide experiential knowledge into 
internationalisation knowledge i.e. the firm’s capability to engage in international 
operations (e.g. routines, procedures, structures), foreign business knowledge i.e. 
knowledge of clients, the market, and competitors, and foreign institutional 
knowledge i.e. knowledge of government, institutional framework, rules, norms and 
values (e.g. how law is applied in practice, bureaucracy, language). The authors argue 
that accumulating experiential knowledge is rather expensive once it requires 
“collection, transmission and interpretation” (Eriksson et al. 1997:341) based on 
current activities, themselves the result of resources committed to the target country. 
 
Correspondingly, the case of Vitrocristal can be interpreted in terms of the sub-
components of experiential knowledge in the one hand, and objective knowledge in 
the other. Such types of knowledge constitute the answer to the first question and 
form the basis for an answer to the second one: can such knowledge be located within 
the internationalising firm? In this respect, Forsgren (2002:266) compares experiential 
knowledge – which he labels market-specific knowledge – with objective knowledge 
as follows: 
 
Market-specific knowledge is something that develops at the operational level, and 
consequently tends to keep the firm within its current business. General knowledge 
can be expected to be accumulated at levels higher up in the hierarchy, and can 
function as a driving force to take steps in directions which are new to the firm. 
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From such an interpretation of experiential- and objective knowledge, respectively, 
Vitrocristal’s entry into the US market can be explained with the objective knowledge 
ordered to outside consultants (with international experience) by its mentor, the head 
of the industrial association. A closer inspection of the components of experiential 
knowledge reveals, however, that internationalisation knowledge is not country-
specific either once “it is a firm-specific experience relevant to all markets” (Eriksson 
et al. 1997:352). From the case description was not clear, however, whether 
Vitrocristal was able to acquire internationalisation knowledge held by its constituent 
firms and more importantly outside consultants.  
 
Taken together, objective knowledge and internationalisation knowledge may explain 
Vitrocristal choice of an investment entry mode – sales subsidiary – into a distant 
country – the US – in an early stage of its internationalisation. Such entry mode 
choice was even anticipated by Johanson and Mattsson (1997:205) who contend that: 
“establishment of a sales subsidiary should be made earlier if the firm is a Late Starter 
than if it is an Early Starter”. It must be noted, however, that, in contrast to the present 
paper, their arguments preclude considerations in terms of objective and experiential 
knowledge. 
 
The two remaining components of experiential knowledge – foreign business 
knowledge and foreign institutional knowledge – are more difficult to assess in the 
case of Vitrocristal. One reason for such a difficulty is conceptual. In fact, from an 
industrial networks perspective, foreign market entry is characterised simultaneously 
by the lack of control of any one actor over such a process, and by the opacity of 
relationships between the actors involved (Axelsson and Mattsson 1992). This means 
that, by itself, Vitrocristal could not control the entry into the US market and, 
therefore, did acquire foreign business knowledge and foreign institutional knowledge 
from other actors in the domestic production network. However, the very relationships 
by which knowledge could be acquired are supposedly opaque or invisible to an 
outsider, rendering almost impossible the empirical confirmation of such an argument.  
 
In this respect, Hadley and Wilson (2003:705) argue that, compared with the Lonely 
International, a Late Starter should enjoy relatively more foreign business knowledge 
and relatively less foreign institutional knowledge. In particular, the foreign business 
knowledge of a Late Starter should be enhanced by its entry into an internationalised 
market, whereas it foreign institutional knowledge should be inhibited by more 
indirect relationships with such a market. This is not the case of Vitrocristal, given the 
entry mode selected. A sales subsidiary represents a direct relationship with the target 
market, which should enhance the firm’s ability to learn about the local institutional 
environment (e.g. government, laws, culture). On the other hand, because 
Vitrocristal’s target market is highly international – the US – there should indeed be 
more opportunities, compared to a Lonely International, to learn about local actors 
(e.g. customers, competitors, suppliers).  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The present paper attempts to explore the extent to which a firm’s knowledge may 
constitute an explanatory variable of its internationalisation. Although knowledge is 
included in the network model of internationalisation, its implications for the firm’s 
internationalisation have usually been articulated in rather superficial fashion. One 
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possible explanation for such a tendency is the very discussion of the four situations 
in the model, which includes arguments for both the “how” and “why” of 
internationalisation. In contrast, the present paper is exclusively focused on one 
“how” of internationalisation – foreign market entry – and in one “why” of 
internationalisation – knowledge. In addition, the paper is exclusively focused on one 
situation of the network model of internationalisation – the Late Starter.  
 
Based on a longitudinal case study the paper seeks to answer two main questions: a) 
what type of knowledge is implicit in the network model of internationalisation? and 
b) can such knowledge be located within the internationalising firm? The first 
question was primarily answered through literature review (e.g. Johanson and Vahlne 
1977; Eriksson et al. 1997; Forsgren 2002) and illustrated with the internationalisation 
of an actor – Vitrocristal – which is a group of firms (Håkansson and Johanson 1984). 
 
The second question was explored rather than answered with the discussion of the 
same case of internationalisation. In this respect, a recent contribution (Hadley and 
Wilson 2003) was also reviewed and confronted with the insights of the case. This 
was important given the acknowledgement by the very same authors that: “a 
longitudinal study would help to identify patterns of knowledge accumulation during 
a firm’s internationalisation process” (Hadley and Wilson 2003:715) in contrast to 
their own “static cross-sectional research design” (Hadley and Wilson 2003:714). 
 
More generally, the present paper poses a question in its own title – Late Starter: a 
situation or a process? In this respect and as mentioned above, the original network 
model of internationalisation has been criticised for being too holistic. In other words, 
it includes a discussion of both the “how” and “why” of firm internationalisation. It 
can therefore be argued that the “how” aspect of a Late Starter is more concerned with 
the process of internationalisation rather than with a situation i.e. the characteristics of 
the firm and the market (production net). This point was, in fact, touched upon by at 
least one earlier contribution, which criticises the loose discussion of the 
internationalisation dimension in the network model (Axelsson and Johanson 1992). 
More specifically, the present paper explores a sub-process associated with the 
situation of Late Starter, by which the internationalising firm may acquire knowledge 
from other actors in the production network. In this respect, the paper suggests that 
objective knowledge and internationalisation knowledge may indeed be acquired 
through relationships, whereas the external acquisition of foreign business knowledge 
and foreign institutional knowledge remains open to debate.  
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